Bonjour à tous,
Demain jeudi 17 novembre, nous accueillerons Stéphanie Delaune du LSV (ENS Cachan) qui nous présentera un exposé intitulé. Le séminaire débutera à 11H en salle 1D23 et sera précédé, comme c'est la tradition, par un pot informel pour nous retrouver autour de thé, café et croissants.
Plus de détails sur le séminaire à http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/seminaire.
Amicalement,
Alexis
Analysing security protocols using process algebra
Stéphanie Delaune
(LSV, ENS Cachan)
Jeudi 17 novembre 2011, 11h salle 1D23
Abstract:
Security is a very old concern, which until quite recently was mostly of interest for military purposes. The deployment of electronic commerce changes this drastically. The security of exchanges is ensured by cryptographic protocols which are notoriously error prone. The formal verification of cryptographic protocols is a difficult problem that can be seen as a particular model-checking problem in an hostile environment. Many results and tools have been developed to automatically verify cryptographic protocols.
Recently, new type of applications have emerged, in order to face new technological and societal challenges, e.g. electronic voting protocols, electronic passport, ... These applications involve some features that are not taken into account by the existing verification tools, e.g. complex cryptographic primitives, privacy-type security properties, ... This prevents us from modelling these protocols in an accurate way. Moreover, protocols are often analysed in isolation and this is well-known to be not sufficient. In this talk, I will present you an attack that has been recently discovered on the French version of the e-passport. We will see how formal methods and process algebra can be used to study different aspects concerning the verification of cryptographic protocols.
--
Alexis Saurin
Chargé de Recherche CNRS
Laboratoire PPS, UMR 7126
Équipe PiR2
CNRS, Université paris Diderot et INRIA
alexis.saurin@pps.jussieu.fr
http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~saurin
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